Beyond Great Power Competition: Middle Power Responses to Strategic Uncertainty in Northeast Asia

By Susan Thornton, Emily Sparkman, and Ashley Quinonez
June 2026

In May 2026, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s Forum on Asia-Pacific Security convened scholars and practitioners from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States for a closed-door Track II dialogue. Participants examined how to navigate an intensifying U.S.-China competition and its effects on regional allies and partners; how to manage growing economic vulnerabilities amid the politicization of trade and supply chains; and how to preserve dialogue amid deepening mistrust.

In the wake of the Trump-Xi summit, regional actors reassessed what a recalibrated U.S.-China relationship means for the region and whether the arrangements they have long relied upon can endure. While the region has avoided direct conflict, many of the assumptions that long underpinned that stability are being tested.

Key Takeaways and Recommendations

• Participants referenced the emergence of “two Americas”: one that views America as the traditional alliance leader for regional stability, and another that embraces a more transactional, less predictable power with unilateral approaches that emphasize burden-sharing, spheres of influence, and selective engagement.
• The central policy question is no longer whether regional powers will balance against China’s growing influence, but how that balancing will occur, with or without sustained U.S. leadership.
• Allies should reinvigorate and strengthen middle-power networks and multilateral arrangements and use issue-specific coalitions focused on economic security, supply chain resilience, tech governance, and regional security.
• Greater transparency about economic objectives and long-term strategic intentions could reduce uncertainty and mitigate risks associated with economic competition.
  • Governments should seek to balance resilience and security concerns against the economic costs of diversification and derisking strategies. 
• The window for negotiations on North Korean denuclearization is currently closed as the regime’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to advance.
  • Preventing a regional nuclear domino effect remains a shared concern as North Korea’s capabilities become more sophisticated, although participants generally put this as a distant prospect.
• Weakening communication channels and declining access to senior decision-makers have made it more difficult for governments to understand one another’s intentions.
• Allies and partners should open and strengthen dialogue mechanisms. Preserving opportunities for engagement remains an important tool for narrowing perception gaps and reducing tensions and miscommunication.