REPORT: The Fragile Stability of Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations

By Susan Thornton and Emily Sparkman
August 2026

Although policy uncertainty has increased and communication channels are woefully inadequate, cross-Taiwan Strait tensions appear to have eased in recent months.  At the NCAFP’s most recent session of its longstanding cross-Taiwan Strait Track II senior dialogue with experts from the United States, Mainland China, and Taiwan, there was a broad consensus that domestic politics are increasingly driving cross-Strait dynamics.  This has led to a fragile tempering of rhetoric and near-term assessments, although the gravity and intractability of the issue remain, and domestic drivers could quickly shift the trajectory.

Key Takeaways and Recommendations

• The current cross-Taiwan Strait environment is one of heightened ambiguity, uncertainty, and diminishing trust rather than imminent military conflict.
  • The situation is stable in the sense that no side seeks imminent conflict, yet stability in the Taiwan Strait remains fragile;
  • U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan is unclear and changeable:
    • The U.S. intelligence community revised its assessment of the urgency of Beijing’s war preparations;
    • Beijing is cautiously optimistic regarding stability on the Taiwan issue after the Trump-Xi summit but remains uncertain about U.S. intentions;
    • Taiwan faces growing uncertainty regarding U.S. commitments while continuing to invest in deterrence.
• Communication is an urgent priority. Official cross-Strait dialogue is absent and even unofficial exchanges on issues in cross-Strait relations are rare.
  • Political weaponization of cross-Strait exchanges predominates amid lack of trust.  Both Taipei and Beijing demonstrate intolerance for exchanges with the other side.  
  • Maintaining open communication channels through Track II and Track 1.5 dialogues is essential to avoiding conflict and reducing misperceptions.  These should be expanded.
• Parties are over-reliant on military signaling, leading to media and public overreaction.
  • Parties should pursue opportunities for increased practical law enforcement cooperation;
  • They should work to establish confidence-building measures, maritime incident protocols, and military crisis management mechanisms that reduce escalation risks.
• Domestic politics are shaping regional security. U.S. domestic politics, Taiwan’s elections and identity politics, and Beijing’s political calculations are making compromise increasingly difficult.
  • Policymakers should prioritize institutional mechanisms that can be resilient across leadership transitions and electoral cycles.
• “Securitization” has drastically altered perceptions of economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, leading to increased costs and tensions.
  • Sides should continue implementation of past cross-Strait agreements and acknowledge practical efforts;
• Cross-Strait confidence-building measures were deemed “difficult,” but participants mooted several specific proposals:
  • Joint or parallel efforts to highlight the 160^th birth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen, the “Father of the Republic of China”
  • Parallel Mainland-Taiwan statements to defend maritime boundary interests in the face of recent Japan-Philippine maritime boundary delimitation talks.
  • Increase student exchanges across the Strait and undertake official actions to make such exchanges more attractive to students.
  • Leaders should remain consistent in their formulations and should not advance new formulations to describe the other side or make sudden policy changes.  This was seen as essential to maintain peace and stability, which is a stated objective of all sides.   
  • Cross-Strait policy dialogues between Mainland and Taiwan non-officials should be held and must include views representative of all parties.  Ground rules regarding security and publicity should be observed.